Habit Persistence and Teen Sex: Could Increased Access to Contraception have Unintended Consequences for Teen Pregnancies?*

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Abstract

We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of teen sex and pregnancy that incorporates habit persistence. Habit persistence has two sources here. The first is a 'fixed cost' of having sex which relates to a moral or psychological barrier that has been crossed the first time one has sex. The second is a 'transition cost' whereby once a particular relationship has progressed to sex, it is difficult to move back. We estimate significant habit persistence in teen sex, implying the the long run effects of contraception policy may be very different from their short run counterparts. Programs that increase access to contraception are found to decrease teen pregnancies in the short run but increase teen pregnancies in the long run. Thus we find that even well intended contraception policies can then be self-defeating.

Keywords: habit persistence, access to contraception, teen pregnancy, dynamic discrete choice

JEL: J13, C33, C51

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1 Introduction

Teenage pregnancy rates, although steadily declining since 1990, are still very high in the United States with 83.6 pregnancies per 1000 teenage women in 2000 (Alan Guttmacher Institute 2004). This rate is substantially higher than Canada and Western Europe (Singh and Darroch 2000). Furstenberg (1998) argues that the higher rate in the United States is in part due to the lack of availability of contraception compared to Western Europe. On the other hand, it may be argued that increased availability of contraceptives will decrease the rate of unprotected sex, *and* lead some individuals to choose sex when they otherwise would have abstained due to the moral hazard generated through the lowered costs of contraception. Previous research has shown that regulations affect sexual behavior. Using aggregate data from the abortion clinics themselves, researchers have found that restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions or access to clinics reduced the number of adolescent abortions but either had no effect or reduced the number of teen births.[1] The lack of an increase in teen births implies a strong behavioral response in sexual activity. Should contraception become more available, those who switch from unprotected sex to protected sex will lower the teen pregnancy rate, while those who move from abstaining to protected sex will increase the teen pregnancy rate due to contraception failure.

The effects of contraception policy may differ between the long and the short run if there is habit persistence in teen sexual behavior. While habit persistence is generally associated with addictive goods, such as alcohol or cigarettes, it can result from other sources as well. For example, if there is a moral or psychological barrier which is crossed the first time one has sex (a fixed cost), once an individual has sex they will be more likely to have sex in the future. That a fixed cost to sex may exist is evident from the large growth in virginity movements. These movements generally have 'virginity pledges' where promises are made to wait until marriage before having sex. Virginity movements have been associated with significant decreases in teen sex and pregnancy rates, particularly for those under the age of 18 (Bearman and Brückner 1997). This emphasis on virginity suggests that the costs to abstaining from sex are higher for those who have been sexually active in the past.

[1]See, for example, Kane and Staiger (1996) and Levine, Trainor, and Zimmerman (1996). Paton (2002) finds no evidence that nearness to family planning clinics reduced either the pregnancy rate or the abortion rate in the United Kingdom, with some evidence that family clinics increased the pregnancy rate.

Data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) also speak to the possibility of the cost of abstaining from sex being higher once one has become sexually active. This panel data set follows individuals who were between the ages of 12 and 16 in 1997. Table 1 shows the sex patterns for women who answered the questions on whether they had sexual intercourse in the first four waves of the survey and who were between the ages 14 and 16 in wave 1. Besides abstaining in all four waves, the most populous cells for each age are those where once one has become sexually active, one is sexually active from that point forward. Further, the least populous cells are those in which the individual transitions in and out of sexual activity. The patterns in the data suggest that there may be a fixed cost (a moral or psychological barrier that has been crossed) and a transition cost (which may be relationship-specific).

Note that person-specific effects cannot be completely driving the persistence. For example, consider an individual who had sex in 1997 but not in 1998. This individual is considerably *less* likely to have sex in 1999 than someone who had sex in 1998 but not in 1997. While person-specific effects may lead to some individuals being more inclined to have sex in every period, no persistence should emerge beyond that due to age effects. Table 1 shows that this is clearly not the case. In fact, the least likely outcome for all ages was a pattern of two stops in sexual activity; having sex, then not, then having sex, then not.

We estimate a dynamic model of sex and fertility for teenage women which allows for habit persistence in both the choice to have sex and the choice to contracept. In each year, individuals decide whether to be sexually active and, if so, whether to use contraception that requires advanced planning (for example, the pill) or to use contraception which can be implemented at the time of the act itself (for example, condoms). Should an individual choose to engage in sex, she becomes pregnant with a probability that depends upon the choice of contraception. As in Hotz and Miller (1993), contraception will reduce, but not eliminate, pregnancy risk. We use the model estimates to forecast the short run and long run effects of increased access to contraception on the rates of teen sex and pregnancy.

As a precursor to the model, we show that fixed costs and transition costs can be accurately estimated even when there are permanent unobserved components to an individual's utility from sex and the panel is short. We conduct a series of Monte Carlos with different data generating processes to illustrate the biases that arise from not controlling for combinations

Table 1: Persistence in Female Sexual Activity†

				Age in 1997		
Sex in 97	Sex in 98	Sex in 99	Sex in 00	14	15	16
No	No	No	No	36.7%	26.8%	17.7%
No	No	No	**Yes**	12.0%	11.3%	8.0%
No	No	**Yes**	**Yes**	15.3%	13.9%	12.8%
No	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	16.9%	18.0%	20.3%
Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	10.6%	18.2%	28.9%
No	No	**Yes**	No	1.4%	2.1%	2.3%
No	**Yes**	No	No	0.6%	1.2%	0.9%
No	**Yes**	No	**Yes**	3.4%	2.1%	1.9%
No	**Yes**	**Yes**	No	0.6%	0.7%	1.4%
Yes	No	No	No	0.4%	0.7%	0.3%
Yes	No	No	**Yes**	0.4%	0.6%	0.5%
Yes	No	**Yes**	No	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%
Yes	No	**Yes**	**Yes**	0.4%	1.8%	1.4%
Yes	**Yes**	No	No	0.2%	0.6%	0.8%
Yes	**Yes**	No	**Yes**	0.8%	1.2%	1.4%
Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**	No	0.2%	0.6%	1.2%

† All females who had valid answers for the sex questions in first four waves. Sample sizes are 498, 727, and 640 for ages 14, 15, and 16 respectively.

of fixed and transition costs as well as unobserved preferences. The Monte Carlos show that separately identifying fixed costs, transition costs, and unobserved heterogeneity is indeed feasible even with a short panel.[2]

The estimates of the model reveal strong habit persistence in teen sexual behavior. These effects are so strong that policies which increase access to contraception, while lowering teen pregnancy rates in the short run, may raise teen pregnancy rates in the long run. Consider a sixteen year old exposed to a policy that increases access to contraception, ceteris paribus. If the policy is a surprise, our simulations reveal that this individual will be less likely to become pregnant at age sixteen. However, a fourteen year old exposed to the same policy from the ages of fourteen through sixteen will actually have a higher probability of becoming pregnant at age sixteen. The differences in the long and short run effects are driven by the habit persistence. Individuals who are sixteen at the time the policy was implemented have already established certain sexual behaviors. Individuals exposed to the policy from age fourteen are more sexually active due to moral hazard arising from the lower contraception costs. This increased sexual activity is reenforcing due to habit persistence and results in higher long run pregnancy rates. Thus our results imply that well intentioned policies regarding teen access to contraception can have unintended consequences in the presence of habit persistence.

Previous dynamic models of fertility decisions have not focused on the persistence of sexual behavior (for example Hotz and Miller 1993, Rosensweig and Shultz 1985, and Wolpin 1984). This is primarily because these studies focus on married couples and the optimal spacing of children; the act of sex itself is taken as given. Models of teen behavior have not focused on the dynamics of sex, in part because of inadequate data. Indeed, the two studies perhaps most related to our own, Lundberg and Plotnik (1995) and Oettinger (1999), used an earlier version of our data set which only asked at what age the individual first had sex; year by year questions on sexual behavior were not asked.

Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) estimate a sequence of choices in a static context using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). They estimate a nested logit model where the sequence of decisions is whether to have a premarital pregnancy, conditional

[2]Distinguishing between unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence has received much attention in other contexts such as unemployment (Heckman 1981) and consumer choices (Keane 1997), with the specification of the structure of the unobserved heterogeneity being problem-specific.

on pregnancy, whether to have an abortion, conditional on not having an abortion, whether to become married. Lundberg and Plotnick find that the behavior of whites responds to the incentives of state welfare, abortion, and family planning policies. While we do not model the decision to marry or abort, we do model the choice to have sex and the choice of contraception and we explicitly account for the dynamics of the decisions.

Oettinger (1999) is one of the few studies in the economics literature to actually examine the decision to have sex as opposed to fertility outcomes. He also looks at fertility outcomes as well, but does not link the model of fertility to the model of sex. He estimates a hazard model of the time to first sex and time to first pregnancy using the NLSY79. Persistence in sexual activity, however, cannot be taken into account because the survey only asked when the respondent first engaged in sexual activity.

2 Monte Carlos

Before proceeding with the actual model and estimation, we first present evidence that we can separately identify habit persistence from unobserved preferences for sexual activity. The Monte Carlos have individuals choose whether or not to have sex in each of five periods. We specify the flow utility from engaging in sex at time t to be a function of whether an individual has ever had sex, s_f, had sex in the previous time period, s_{t-1}, as well as an individual's unobserved preference for sex, α_{0i}, which is not time-varying. Normalizing the flow utility of no sex to zero subject to an additive error, ϵ_{0it}, we write the flow utility of sex as:

$$u(s_t = 1) = \alpha_{0i} - \alpha_1(1 - s_f) - \alpha_2(1 - s_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{1it} \tag{1}$$

where the ϵ_{it}'s are the indvidual's unobserved preferences. Individuals who have not paid the fixed cost or transition cost of sex then find sex less attractive.

Forward looking individuals recognize these costs. The value function for choosing sex at time t is given by:

$$v(s_t = 1) = u(s_t = 1) + \beta E_t(V_{t+1}|s_t = 1) \tag{2}$$

where β is the discount factor and V_{t+1} is the expected value of the best choice in the next period. The data generating process we use assumes that the ϵ's are IID Type I extreme value. With the assumed distribution of the ϵ's, Rust (1987) derived the closed form expression for

the expected value of future utility. We further assume that the α_{0i}'s take on one of two values: α_{01} and α_{02} with the probability of a simulated individual receiving the latter set at π. In addition to fixed and transition costs and unobserved heterogeneity, we also control for time fixed effects.[3] Although all the time effects are set at zero, controlling for these effects may soak up some of the habit persistence when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored and some the unobserved heterogeneity when habit persistence is ignored.[4]

We then generate data in three ways:

1. Fixed and transition costs are non-zero but there is no unobserved heterogeneity. That is, α_1 and α_2 are non-zero but $\alpha_{01} = \alpha_{02}$.

2. Fixed and transition costs are set at zero but there is unobserved heterogeneity. That is, $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$ and $\alpha_{01} \neq \alpha_{02}$.

3. Fixed and transition costs are non-zero and there is unobserved heterogeneity.

For each of these data generating processes we estimate models that include and do not include fixed and transition costs as well as unobserved heterogeneity. We can then see whether fixed and transition costs can be separately identified from unobserved heterogeneity given a short panel and also assess the biases that result from not controlling for one or the other. The log likelihood for the most general model then follows a mixture distribution:

$$L(\alpha, \pi) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \log \left(\sum_{k=1}^{2} \pi_k \left[\prod_{t=1}^{5} \mathcal{L}(s_{nt} | s_{nt-1}, s_{nf}, \alpha, k) \right] \right)$$

Table 2 shows the average parameter estimates for 2000 simulated data sets of 3000 individuals each as well as the parameters of the data generating process. The value of β is set at 1, though we have also performed all the simulations with β set at 0 and the qualitative results were the same. The first column shows the model estimates with no unobserved heterogeneity, the second column has unobserved heterogeneity but no habit persistence, and the third column has both habit persistence and unobserved heterogeneity.

[3] These are equivalent to age fixed effects given that in the Monte Carlos all individuals are the same age in each time period.

[4] Not including time dummies exacerbated the biases as well as made the predictions of misspecified models even further from those of the data generating process.

Table 2: Parameter Estimates from the Monte Carlos†

		True	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Values	Coeff.	Std. Dev.	Coeff.	Std. Dev.	Coeff.	Std. Dev.
	Intercept	0	0.002	0.046	0.176	0.068	-0.181	0.731
DGP	Fixed Cost	0.4	0.402	0.042			0.392	0.044
Model 1	Trans. Cost	0.6	0.598	0.060			0.589	0.061
	Type 2				1.758	0.071	0.398	0.982
	Prob. Type 2				0.354	0.038	0.495	0.197
	Log likelihood		-9589		-9750		-9589	
	Intercept	0	-0.595	0.044	0.015	0.130	0.012	0.166
DGP	Fixed Cost		0.082	0.044			0.001	0.047
Model 2	Trans. Cost		0.1806	0.0507			0.001	0.057
	Type 2	-1			-1.035	0.081	-1.041	0.103
	Prob. Type 2	0.5			0.5	0.118	0.495	0.130
	Log likelihood		-9970		-9948		-9947	
	Intercept	0	-0.640	0.043	1.455	0.096	0.016	0.145
DGP	Fixed Cost	0.4	0.528	0.051			0.401	0.056
Model 3	Trans. Cost	0.6	0.792	0.067			0.597	0.073
	Type 2	-1			-2.101	0.0576	-1.0459	0.1161
	Prob. Type 2	0.5			0.686	0.0254	0.498	0.114
	Log likelihood		-8748		-8860		-8727	

† Estimates were taken form 2000 sets of 3000 simulated individuals. The discount factor is set at 1. Model 1 refers to the estimated model where unobserved heterogeneity is unaccounted for, DGP model 1 refers to the data generating process where there is no unobserved heterogeneity. Model 2 refers to the estimated model where habit persistence is unaccounted for, DGP model 2 refers to the data generating process where there is no habit persistence. Model 3 and DGP model three refer to the estimated model and the data generating process respectively when both unobserved heterogeneity and habit persistence are present.

The first set of rows shows the case when the data generating process has no unobserved heterogeneity but the fixed and transition costs are significant. Not surprisingly, when the estimated model is specified as the data generating process the parameter estimates match those of the data generating process. Further, estimating a model with both habit persistence and unobserved heterogeneity when the true model does not have unobserved heterogeneity still yields correct estimates of habit persistence with the unobserved heterogeneity parameters not significantly different from zero: the log likelihoods in the first and third columns are identical. The second column leads to significant estimates of unobserved heterogeneity as the unobserved heterogeneity approximates (poorly) the habit persistence.

The second set of rows shows the case when the data generating process has unobserved heterogeneity but no habit persistence. Estimating the model with just habit persistence shows that the habit persistence parameters pick up some of the effects of the unaccounted for unobserved heterogeneity. Estimating with just unobserved heterogeneity or with both unobserved heterogeneity and habit persistence yields estimates indistinguishable from the true values, with the latter yielding habit persistence parameters that were very small and insignificant.

The most interesting results are in the third set of rows. Here we show that when the true data generating process has both unobserved heterogeneity and habit persistence estimating a model with both will yield estimates indistinguishable from those of the data generating process even when the number of observations per individual is small. Consistent with the first and and second set of rows, not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity when it is present yields too much habit persistence while not accounting for habit persistence yields parameter estimates that attribute too much of the variation in the data to unobserved heterogeneity.

Table 3 presents some of the patterns that results from the data generating process that help to separate out unobserved heterogeneity from habit persistence. Here we show probabilities of various courses of action where the true data generating process has both unobserved heterogeneity and habit persistence. In particular, we examine the probability of having sex conditional on three histories: never having had sex, had sex in the past but not in the previous period, and had sex in the previous period.

Not surprisingly, a model which accounts for both unobserved heterogeneity and habit persistence yield estimated behavior similar to the trends in the data. Accounting for just

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Sex Conditional on Sex Histories[†]

		Probability of Sex				
		t=1	t=2	t=3	t=4	t=5
	Data	0.510	0.459	0.431	0.437	0.512
Mean |	Model 1[‡]	0.510	0.448	0.437	0.459	0.543
History[§]=1	Model 2	0.510	0.540	0.479	0.454	0.501
	Model 3	0.510	0.459	0.431	0.437	0.513
	Data			0.653	0.642	0.671
Mean |	Model 1			0.647	0.639	0.668
History=2	Model 2			0.696	0.663	0.673
	Model 3			0.653	0.642	0.670
	Data		0.808	0.802	0.800	0.820
Mean |	Model 1		0.818	0.802	0.796	0.816
History=3	Model 2		0.730	0.762	0.782	0.816
	Model 3		0.808	0.802	0.800	0.820

† Simulations are conducted using the parameter values from the third set of rows in table 2. Each simulation is conducted on 2000 times using 3000 simulated individuals.

‡ Model 1 accounts for habit persistence but not unobserved heterogeneity, model 2 accounts for unobserved heterogeneity but not habit persistence, model 3 accounts for both.

§ History=1 refers to those who have never had sex. History=2 refers to those who have had sex in the past but not at $t-1$. History=3 refers to those who have had sex at $t-1$.

unobserved heterogeneity yields too low of a sex rate for those who had sex in the previous period and too high of a sex rate for those who have never had sex— particularly in the earlier time periods. In contrast, in the first few time periods, accounting for just habit persistence yields too high of a sex rate for those had sex in the previous period and too low of a sex rate for those who have never had sex. These patterns flip in later time periods with sex rates that are too high when an individual has never had sex and when we do not account for unobserved heterogeneity. The Monte Carlos then suggest that the patterns of sexual behavior over time allow us to separately identify both habit persistence and unobserved heterogeneity if either are present.

3 Model and Estimation

What distinguishes our work from much of the previous literature is that we do not model fertility as a single choice, but as a sequence of choices integrated with uncertainty about pregnancy outcomes. Individuals make decisions regarding sex knowing that there is some probability of becoming pregnant, with the probability being lower if contraceptives are used. Individuals may still engage in unprotected sex even though *ex post* they may regret the decision if they become pregnant. This can still be consistent with a rational expectations framework. The key is that, given the probability of getting pregnant without contraception, the expected utility was still higher for having unprotected sex. Hence, the flow utility of having sex without contraception compensated the individual for the increased probability of becoming pregnant. We first discuss the model without including unobserved heterogeneity and then follow with how unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated.

3.1 Base Model

We propose a dynamic discrete choice model of sex and contraception decisions. Throughout the model, we want to distinguish 'flow utility', utility in the period, from the full consequences of having sex which include the utility of various pregnancy outcomes. Although decisions with regard to sex are joint decisions, since women have to bear the consequences of a pregnancy through carrying the child and have the exclusive right to abort the child, we model the decisions from the perspective of the woman.

In each period of T periods women choose whether to engage in sexual activity. Those who engage in sex must also decide whether to contracept and, if so, what type of contraception to use. We distinguish between two types of contraception: *scheduled contraception*, which requires advanced planning such as the pill, and *episode-specific contraception*, where the choice to use it can be postponed until the act itself. Define c_t as the sex and contraception combination chosen at time t where:

$$c_t = \begin{cases} NS & \text{if abstains} \\ NC & \text{if sex, but no contraception} \\ EC & \text{if sex with episode-specific contraception} \\ SC & \text{if sex with scheduled contraception} \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

Individuals receive flow utility from having sex that may vary across observable characteristics such as the family environment. The flow utility may also depend upon past sexual decisions. We allow there to be both a fixed and transition cost for sex itself, as well as fixed and transition costs for the two types of contraception. The fixed and transition costs for sex are included to capture a moral or psychological barrier associated with losing one's virginity (the fixed cost) or through having sex the first time in a particular relationship (the transition cost). With regard to contraception, in addition to a per-period cost to using it, there may be a fixed cost to learning or acquiring particular contraception and it may also be easier to access particular forms of contraception if they were used recently. Let c_{ft} represent the possible fixed cost states and c_{t-1} the lagged choices which are over the same set as c_t. Define c_{ft} as:

$$c_{ft} = \begin{cases} NS & \text{if never had sex in the past} \\ NC & \text{if had sex in the past, but never used contraception} \\ EC & \text{if had sex in the past, but only used episode-specific} \\ & \text{contraception or no contraception} \\ SC & \text{if had sex in the past, but only used scheduled} \\ & \text{contraception or no contraception} \\ BC & \text{if had sex in the past and have used both scheduled} \\ & \text{and episode-specific contraception} \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

Normalizing the flow utility of abstaining to zero, the flow utility for sex without contraception, with episode-specific contraception, and with scheduled contraception are specified

as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
u_t(NC) &= X_{1t}\alpha_0 \quad -[1-(c_{ft}\neq NS)]\alpha_1 - [1-(c_{t-1}\neq NS)]\alpha_2 + \epsilon_t(NC) && (5)\\
u_t(EC) &= X_{1t}\alpha_0 \quad -[1-(c_{ft}\neq NS)]\alpha_1 - [1-(c_{t-1}\neq NS)]\alpha_2 && (6)\\
&\qquad -[1-(c_{ft}\in\{EC,BC\})]\alpha_{31} - [1-(c_{t-1}=EC)]\alpha_{41} - \alpha_{51} + \epsilon_t(EC)\\
u_t(SC) &= X_{1t}\alpha_0 \quad -[1-(c_{ft}\neq NS)]\alpha_1 - [1-(c_{t-1}\neq NS)]\alpha_2 && (7)\\
&\qquad -[1-(c_{ft}\in\{SC,BC\})]\alpha_{32} - [1-(c_{t-1}=SC)]\alpha_{42} - \alpha_{52} + \epsilon_t(SC)
\end{aligned}
$$

where X_{1t} captures religion and other characteristics of the family environment. The ϵ's refer to the unobserved preference for particular sex and contraception combinations. Note that the coefficients on X_1 are common across the sex choices. Similarly, the fixed and transition costs for sex itself does not vary across the contraception choices.

Those who engage in sex weigh the flow utility of sex against the probability and consequences of becoming pregnant. Conditional on having sex, we assume that probability of becoming pregnant follows a logit form:

$$p_{ct} = \frac{\exp(Z_t\gamma_0 + \gamma_c)}{1+\exp(Z_t\gamma_0+\gamma_c)} \tag{8}$$

where Z_t includes variables related to fecundity. The γ_c's refer to indicator variables for each of the possible contraception choices (no contraception, episode-specific, or scheduled).

Given that the decision as to whether to abort or give birth is often very traumatic, and given limited data on abortions,[5] we do not model the abortion decision. Rather, we model the lifetime utility from that point forward using a terminal value function. Since we are only interested in teenage sexual behavior, we also assign a terminal value function for individuals who arrive to age nineteen without becoming pregnant. Examples of variables which will affect this terminal utility but not the flow utility of having sex are ability measures and family income as the opportunity cost of a child will be higher for those who have better expected labor market outcomes. We write the terminal value function as a linear function of the state variables and demographic characteristics:

$$V_T = X_T\alpha_T. \tag{9}$$

[5]See Jones and Forest (1992) for a detailed discussion of the quality of abortion data from surveys.

Normalizations must be made in order to identify the model. We normalize the utility of making it to age 19 without a pregnancy to zero.

In addition to uncertainty regarding future pregnancy outcomes and on unobservable preferences, individuals also face uncertainty regarding the state variables themselves. We allow for uncertainty regarding whether or not one's mother works, whether a divorce occurs, and whether the individual lives with her parents.[6] We assume that individuals know the stochastic processes governing these variables and these processes do not depend upon decisions made by the individual regarding their sexual behavior. Since these variables are not the focus of the analysis, we discuss the estimation of the transitions of these variables in the appendix.

With uncertainty on pregnancies and the values of the observed and unobserved state variables, we can write the expected lifetime utility of particular sex and contraception choices as:

$$v_t(c_t) = u_t(c_t) + \beta[p_{ct}E_t(V_{pt}) + (1 - p_{ct})E_t(V_{t+1}|c_t)] \tag{10}$$

where p is the probability of becoming pregnant conditional on choice c, V_{jt} represents the value of the best option in the jth subperiod, and β is the discount factor. Individuals then choose the option with the highest values for v_{1t}. The expectations are taken with respect to future unobservable preferences and observed state variables as well as future pregnancy states.

With the added assumption that the unobservable preference terms are distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value,[7] closed form solutions for the conditional expectations of future utility exist (Rust 1987). We can now write equation (11) as:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{1t}(c_t) \;=\; & u_{1t}(c_t) + \sum_{s_{t+1}=1}^{S} \beta\Bigg(\mu_a p_{ct} \log\left[\exp(\overline{v}_{2t}(A)) + \exp(\overline{v}_t(B))\right] + (1 - p_{ct}) \log\Bigg[\exp(\overline{v}_{1t+1}(NS)) \\ & + \exp\left(\overline{v}_{1t+1}(NC)\right) + \exp\left(\overline{v}_{1t+1}(EC)\right) + \exp\left(\overline{v}_{1t+1}(SC)\right)\Bigg]\Bigg) p(s_{t+1}) \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

where the $\overline{v}$'s are net of the unobservable preference term in period t; the one-period ahead unobservable preferences are unknown until after the current choice has been made. Note

[6] While uncertainty also exists due to the probability of contracting a sexually transmitted disease, our data set includes no information on the STDs.

[7] More general correlation structures are possible using a GEV framework (for example, Arcidiacono 2005 and Khwaja 2001). We experimented with more flexible correlation structures and were unable to reject the Type I extreme value assumption.

that these $\overline{v}'s$ depend upon the values of the state variables, some of which are uncertain. Hence, we sum over all possible states weighting by the probabilities of transitioning into those states, the $p(s_{t+1})$'s. Given the specification of the terminal value function, it is possible to solve backwards for the expectations on future utility.

In order to ensure that we are truly picking up habit persistence, we also control for a full set of age-choice interactions normalized with respect to the utility of no sex. Full sets of age dummies come at a cost as it is now unclear what variation in the data identifies the discount factor.[8] We therefore set the discount factor at 0.9, though we have also estimated the model with the discount factor set at zero as this has little effect on the estimated effects of habit persistence.

Probabilities of choosing particular sex and contraception combinations then yield multinomial logit probabilities where, instead of the term inside the exponential function being linear in the parameters, it is highly nonlinear. The log likelihood function is then the sum of three parts:

$$L(\alpha, \beta, \gamma) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} L_c(c_{nt}|\alpha, \beta, \gamma) + L_p(p_{nt}|\gamma) + L_s(s_{nt}|\gamma) \tag{12}$$

where L_c, L_p, and L_s refer to the log likelihood contributions of the sex and contraception decision, the probability of becoming pregnant, and the transitions on the other state variables. Since the log likelihood is additively separable, it is possible to estimate the parameters of the model in stages. In particular, we estimate the pregnancy and transition parameters separately from the utility function parameters.

3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity

There may, however, still be unobservable preferences for having sex. As shown in the Monte Carlos, not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may attribute to much sexual activity to habit persistence.[9] In order to account for unobserved preferences, we estimate the model that using mixture distributions to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the taste for sex. Mixture distributions can be used to overcome this problem and control for 'dynamic selec-

[8] Arcidiacono, Sieg, and Sloan (2005) use age-behavior profiles to identify the discount factor.

[9] Gilleskie and Strumpf (2001) deal with a similar issue in the context of youth smoking.

tion'.[10] Namely, let there be K types of people with π_k being the population probability of being the kth type. Preferences are common across types and types are known to the individuals. We assume that, conditional on observed characteristics and one's unobserved type, the unobserved preferences are serially uncorrelated. Treating type as a random effect, it is possible to integrate out the probability of being a particular type. The log likelihood function is then:

$$L(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \pi) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \log \left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_k \left[\prod_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{L}_c(c_{nt}|\alpha, \beta, \gamma, k) \mathcal{L}_p(p_{nt}|\gamma) \mathcal{L}_s(s_{nt}|\gamma) \right] \right) \tag{13}$$

where the π's are the population probabilities of being a particular type[11] and the $\mathcal{L}$'s are the likelihoods rather than the log likelihoods. Since the probability of a pregnancy conditional on sexual behavior as well as the other transition processes do not depend upon type, we can rewrite the log likelihood as:

$$L(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \pi) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \log \left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_k \left[\prod_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{L}_c(c_{nt}|\alpha, \beta, \gamma, k) \right] \right) + \sum_{t=1}^{T} L_p(p_{nt}|\gamma) + L_s(s_{nt}|\gamma). \tag{14}$$

Estimation can again proceed in stages. As before, we first estimate the probability of becoming pregnant conditional on the choice of sexual activity as well as whether or not one's mother works, whether a divorce occurs, and whether the individual lives with his parents. Taking these parameters as given, we estimate the parameters of the utility function.

4 Data

We use the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) to estimate the model. The NLSY97 data contain surveys of youths born during the years 1980 to 1984. The first survey was conducted in 1997, when the individuals were between the ages of 12 and 16. Participants are interviewed each year, with six waves of the data currently available. Blacks and Hispanics were oversampled.

[10] In addition to Gilleskie and Strumf, mixture distributions have been used to account for dynamic selction in dynamic discrete choice models by Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2000, 2001), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), and Cameron and Heckman (1999, 2001) among many others.

[11] In principle, these population probabilities can vary with state variables. See, for example, Keane and Wolpin (1997,2000,2001). This is done to account for initial conditions, something which is unnecessary as we have the full sex history.

In each wave those surveyed by the NLSY97 answer questions about their sexual activity. They are also asked what percentage of the time they used contraception and what their primary form of contraception was. Over 55% report using birth control every time they had sexual intercourse. We classify those who use contraception less than 100% of the time under the unprotected (no contraception) category. Those individuals who reported using contraception every time but whose primary method of birth control was withdrawal or the rhythm method were classified as unprotected as well. Episode-specific contraception was defined as condoms, foam, jelly, sponges, and diaphragm. Scheduled contraception was defined as the pill, intrauterine devices (IUDs), Norplant, Depo-Provera, and injectables.[12] We only use continuous sex histories beginning from age 14. For example, if an individual is 14 in wave 1 and answers the sex questions in wave 1 and 2 but not wave 3, no survey answers after wave 2 would be used regardless of whether or not answers were given in waves 4 and 5. For more detailed descriptive statistics on the sex rates and the use of contraception, see Walker (2003).

Means conditional on the choice of sex and contraception type are given in Table 4 using the first five waves of the survey.[13] Roughly seventeen percent of the sample was classified as unprotected, with twelve and eight percent using episode-specific and scheduled contraception respectively. Those who engage in sex tend to be older, particularly those who choose scheduled contraception.

The variables listed either affect the flow utility directly or affect decisions through the terminal value function. All independent variables are taken from wave one of the survey with the exception of mother working, two-parent family and whether the individual was living with their biological mother. The mother work variable takes on a value of one if the mother

[12]In earlier waves, individuals were asked what fraction of the time they used birth control and, if they were protected what the primary method of birth control was. In later waves, the individuals were first asked what percent of the time a condom was used when they had sex. They were also asked what percent of the time birth control was used as well as the primary birth control method besides a condom. If the woman reported using a condom 100% of the time, than the birth control method was classified as episode-specific. If all the acts were protected but a condom was used less than 100% of the time, we used the primary method besides a condom to determine whether to classify the birth control as episode-specific or scheduled.

[13]Only individuals fourteen and older were asked the sex questions, while only individuals 14 and younger in 1997 were asked about parental religious practices, limiting our sample sizes. We also eliminate all individuals who did not report a family income in wave 1.

works full-time.[14] Two-parent family refers to the family structure where the teen lives with both biological parents. While coming from a two-parent family is associated with less sex, having a working mother or no longer living with one's biological mother is associated with higher sexual activity.

In work not reported here, religious denominations had little effect on the sex and contraception choices. Rather, what is reported in the table and has significant influence on the choices is how often one's mother prays. Having a mother who prays more than once a day is associated with abstaining. Conditional on using contraception, a praying mother is associated with a higher probability of choosing episode-specific contraception. Higher incomes and test scores are also associated with abstaining and, conditional on sex, higher rates of contraception suggesting that the cost of a pregnancy may be higher for those with better labor market options.

The NLSY97 contains detailed information on the timing of births, abortions, and miscarriages. For the pregnancy data, we date all births, abortions, and miscarriages back to when the sex act would have taken place. A birth reported in wave 2 may have resulted from intercourse in either wave 1 or wave 2. To determine whether pregnancy resulted from sex in wave 1 or wave 2, the date a birth takes place is dated back nine months. This latter date is then linked to the sex decisions for the relevant wave. Similarly, the NLSY97 reports the date of miscarriages and abortions as well as how far along the pregnancy was at the time of the miscarriage or abortion. Pregnancies are then the sum of births, miscarriages, and abortions.

Table 5 presents means conditional on pregnancy outcomes. Because there are so few variables used here and since by assumption the pregnancy parameters can be estimated outside of the model, we are able to use a much larger sample. Those who become pregnant are older than those who did not. Both kinds of contraception are associated with much lower pregnancy rates than unprotected sex. However, even with 100% reported contraception pregnancies still result.

[14] In wave 1, we do not observe whether the mother worked full-time or part-time. For wave 1, we classify a mother as working full-time if she also worked full-time in wave 2. For those who did not work full-time in wave 2 but reported working in wave 1, we set the probability of working full-time in wave 1 to match the transitions from work to not work, and work to work in the future waves. This probability was 0.38.

Table 4: Means Conditional on Sex and Contraception Choices[†]

		Contraception Conditional on Sex		
			Episode-	
	No Sex	None	Specific	Scheduled
Black	0.221	0.298	0.342	0.179
Mother Works Full-time[‡]	0.601	0.726	0.660	0.715
Two Parent Family[§]	0.613	0.417	0.472	0.480
No Longer Living with Mother	0.137	0.327	0.260	0.261
Mother Prays Regularly (1997)	0.597	0.524	0.586	0.528
Math Percentile	52.2	44.3	43.9	51.1
	(33.8)	(33.0)	(33.5)	(32.2)
Household Income (1997)	47765	36551	38913	38279
	(40768)	(30677)	(34563)	(28043)
Age	16.0	16.9	16.7	17.2
	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.1)
Observations	3080	834	707	341

[†]Standard deviations in parenthesis

[‡]Conditional on living with one's biological mother and after wave 1. In wave 1, no distinction was made between part and full-time work.

[§] Conditional on living with one's biological mother. No updated information is available on these variables when the individual leaves home.

Table 5: Means Conditional on Pregnancy State for Those Who Were Sexually Active†

	Not Pregnant	Pregnant
Episode-Specific Contraception	0.353	0.185
Scheduled Contraception	0.227	0.168
Age	18.0	18.4
	(1.7)	(1.6)
Observations	7437	1012

†Standard deviations in parenthesis. Sample includes all females between the ages of 14 and 22 who had sex in waves 1-5. All pregnancies are dated back to the sex decisions in these waves. The sample also include pregnancies reported in wave 6 that resulted from sex acts in wave 5.

5 Results

We now proceed to the estimates of the model, beginning with the pregnancy parameters. Estimates of the transition parameters on family status, mother working, and living with one's biological mother are reported in the appendix. Recall that the pregnancy parameters are only estimated for those who chose to engage in sexual intercourse. Table 6 presents the logit estimates of the probability of a pregnancy. As individuals age, they are more likely to become pregnant conditional on their choice of protection. The coefficients on both episode-specific and scheduled contraception are significantly negative.

To get a sense for the magnitude of the effects of age and contraception on the probability of becoming pregnant, Table 7 shows the estimated pregnancy probabilities conditional on age and contraception choice. The probability of becoming pregnant increases substantially as individuals age, doubling from age 14 to age 19 regardless of the type of contraception employed. Both contraception methods are effective but not foolproof. Unprotected pregnancy rates are about two times that of episode-specific and scheduled contraception.

The parameters characterizing the flow utility of sex are given in Table 8. The first set of rows shows the coefficients on the demographic characteristics. Having a mother who prays regularly and coming from a two parent family both lower the probability of engaging in sex.

Table 6: Probability of Becoming Pregnant[†]

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Episode-Specific Contraception	-1.038	0.087
Scheduled Contraception	-0.805	0.092
Age	0.169	0.021
Constant	-4.632	0.384
Observations	8449	

[†] Logit estimates. Sample includes all females between the ages of 14 and 22 who had sex in waves 1-5. All pregnancies are dated back to the sex decisions in these waves. The sample also include pregnancies reported in wave 6 that resulted from sex acts in wave 5.

Table 7: Estimated Pregnancy Probabilities

	Age					
	14	15	16	17	18	19
Unprotected	0.0937	0.1091	0.1266	0.1465	0.1689	0.1939
Episode-Specific	0.0353	0.0416	0.0488	0.0573	0.0671	0.0785
Scheduled	0.0442	0.0519	0.0608	0.0712	0.0832	0.0971

In contrast, having a mother who works or living with one's biological mother positively affects the probability of sex. The full effects of these variables is even stronger as in the Appendix we show that a working mother makes an intact family less likely, while a praying mother makes an intact family more likely. Similarly, an intact family and a praying mother make it less likely that a mother will work.

The second panel shows the parameters of the terminal value function conditional on becoming pregnant. Higher test scores and parental income then makes sex—particularly unprotected sex— less attractive as the opportunity cost of a child is increasing in both test

scores and income. We parameterized the unobserved preferences for sex using a two-type mixture distribution.[15] The second type, which makes up a little less than half the population, is substantially less likely to have sex than the first type.

The final set of rows show the persistence parameters. For both contraception choices, we see no transition costs. However, both yield substantial fixed costs with the fixed cost of scheduled contraception roughly three times that of episode-specific contraception. There then may be a tradeoff between encouraging the use of the pill versus encouraging condoms. Condoms stop STD's, but encouraging individuals to use the pill will make birth control more of a habit. Both fixed and transition costs are significant for sex itself, with the fixed cost being roughly three times that of episode-specific contraception and approximately three times the sex transition cost. Such large effects imply that the long run effects of policy on sexual behavior will be different from the short run effects.

The utility function parameters are difficult to interpret because of the nonlinearities in the choice function. To see how demographic characteristics and habit persistence affect the sex choices, we calculate the probabilities of each of the choices given different demographics and sex histories. In particular, we forecast the decisions of sixteen year olds given the characteristics of those who are fourteen. We then assign the different values for particular demographic characteristics and see how these affect the probability of choosing particular sex options at age sixteen. Results of these simulations are given in Table 9.

The first set of rows gives the unconditional probabilities of sex choices at age sixteen. Moving from having a mother who does not pray regularly to one who does decreases the probability of having sex by over eleven percent. Contraception is relatively more popular for those with mothers who do not pray regularly. Individuals who are more likely to have sex in the future also expect to receive higher benefits from paying the fixed costs associated with contraception. The effect of an intact family is even stronger–moving from an intact family at age fourteen to a single parent family at age fourteen leads to an over twenty percent increase in the probability of having sex at age sixteen. In contrast, having a working mother at age fourteen pushes up the probability of having sex at fourteen by five percent. The results for test scores are weaker. Moving form the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the

[15] We experimented with more types but the results consistently yielded estimates such that additional types were indistinguishable from the first two types.

Table 8: Parameters of the Utility Function†

	Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error
	Black	0.283	0.136
	Mother Works Full-time	0.292	0.096
Demographics	Two Parent Family	-0.520	0.114
	No Longer Living with Mother	0.567	0.138
	Mother Prays Regularly	-0.256	0.088
	Type 2	-1.656	0.227
	Black	-0.770	1.296
Pregnancy	Math Score (0's)	-0.268	0.144
Costs	1997 Family Income ($0000)	-0.505	0.145
	Sex Transition Cost	-0.398	0.183
	Sex Fixed Cost	-1.425	0.262
Habit	Episode-Specific Contraception Transition Cost	0.104	0.239
Persistence	Episode-Specific Contraception Fixed Cost	-0.489	0.191
	Scheduled Contraception Transition Cost	-0.133	0.498
	Scheduled Contraception Fixed Cost	-1.593	0.438
	Prob. Type 2	0.434	0.058
	Observations	4962	

† Estimates from the dynamic discrete choice model on only those who have continuous sex histories. The discount factor is set at 0.9. The utility function included age interacted with each of the choices. These represent flow utility at each age.

distribution increases the probability of sex by a four percent.

The next set of rows conditions on history. That is, instead of forecasting what the history will be given particular demographic characteristics, we will instead assume a particular sexual

history. The second set of rows assumes a history of no sex while the third set assumes the person had sex in the previous period (age 15) and used episode-specific contraception. The differences across the second and third set of rows are quite large. While an individual who had an intact family at age sixteen would abstain eighty-three percent of the time conditional on abstaining in the past, the probability that a similar individual who had sex with episode-specific contraception in the previous period is less than forty-four percent. Habit persistence is much more important in determining sexual activity than having a praying mother, an intact family, or a mother works.

These estimated effects and the policy simulations conducted in the next section are meaningless if the model does not fit the data. Using the sample of those aged fourteen, we forecast the sex choices and fertility outcomes and see how well this matches the trends in the data. The model predictions for ages 14 through 19 are shown in Table 10. Although we would expect to match the trends given the full set of age interactions, we are forecasting ahead with a particular subset of individuals. With the exception of slightly over-predicting sex for those who are fifteen or sixteen, the predictions match the data quite well.

6 Policy Simulations

Given the model matches the predicted choices of sex and contraception use reasonably well, we now turn to policy simulations that examine the effects of changes in access to contraception for teen. In particular, we forecast the sex and contraception decisions and consequent pregnancy outcomes for sixteen year olds both when the policy is initially put into place (and thereby surprising the current sixteen year olds) and in the next two years after the policy. We use the characteristics of the fourteen year olds for the simulations. Hence, in year three of the policy sixteen year olds will have been exposed to the policy since they were fourteen.

We focus on two hypothetical policies. The first policy simulates the effects of increases in access to contraception. This could be through ad campaigns that encourage the use of condoms or through making condoms available in school bathrooms, both of which lower the effective costs of condoms. This is accomplished by raising the utility of episode-specific contraception. The second policy simulates the effects of decreasing the access to contraception. In this case the utility of using birth control is decreased (increasing the effective cost), though

Table 9: Choice Probabilities For Those Aged 16 Under Different Demographics[†]

		Mother Prays		Family Intact		Mother Works		Math Score	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	75th	25th
Unconditional Probability	Abstaining	0.6652	0.5970	0.6872	0.5695	0.6241	0.6592	0.6539	0.6269
	Unprotected Sex	0.1445	0.1685	0.1358	0.1785	0.1594	0.1461	0.1443	0.1609
	Episode-Specific Contraception	0.1378	0.1696	0.1282	0.1821	0.1566	0.1410	0.1462	0.1534
	Scheduled Contraception	0.0525	0.0650	0.0487	0.0699	0.0599	0.0538	0.0600	0.0600
Conditional on $c_{fc} = NS, c_{15} = NS$	Abstaining	0.8147	0.7655	0.8301	0.7502	0.7884	0.8065	0.8076	0.7884
	Unprotected Sex	0.0791	0.0976	0.0727	0.1036	0.0892	0.0819	0.0799	0.0902
	Episode-Specific Contraception	0.0901	0.1162	0.0826	0.1240	0.1038	0.0947	0.0955	0.1029
	Scheduled Contraception	0.0160	0.0208	0.0146	0.0222	0.0185	0.0169	0.0171	0.0184
Conditional on $c_{fc} = EC, c_{15} = EC$	Abstaining	0.4203	0.3638	0.4366	0.3449	0.3885	0.4122	0.4100	0.3901
	Unprotected Sex	0.1963	0.2090	0.1917	0.2142	0.2041	0.1973	0.1940	0.2069
	Episode-Specific Contraception	0.3447	0.3838	0.3342	0.3969	0.3662	0.3511	0.3562	0.3621
	Scheduled Contraception	0.0387	0.0434	0.0374	0.0449	0.0412	0.0395	0.0399	0.0409

[†] Forecasted from the characteristics of fourteen year-olds. Effects for intact family and mother works are the effects from having these characteristics at age 14.

Table 10: Comparing Model Predictions with the Data[†]

	Age=14		Age=15		Age=16		Age=17		Age=18		Age=19	
Probability of:	Model	Data	Model	Data	Model	Data	Model	Data	Model	Data	Model	Data
Abstaining	0.861	0.861	0.739	0.792	0.638	0.674	0.518	0.534	0.406	0.415	0.310	0.315
Unprotected Sex	0.067	0.067	0.105	0.086	0.154	0.141	0.209	0.204	0.271	0.264	0.335	0.327
Episode-specific	0.067	0.067	0.133	0.103	0.151	0.134	0.171	0.165	0.197	0.195	0.214	0.210
Scheduled	0.006	0.006	0.023	0.018	0.058	0.052	0.102	0.097	0.126	0.126	0.141	0.148

[†]Model predictions are calculated using the characteristics of fourteen year olds.

the utility of sex itself is left *unchanged*. An example of this could be information campaigns or curbing the distribution of contraceptives on school premises. Table 11 shows the percentage change in the four sex activity measures (no sex, sex without contraception, episode-specific contraception, and scheduled contraception) and the percentage change in the probability of becoming pregnant after the each of the policies have been implemented. The first panel of Table 11 is for the population while the second panel focuses on those individuals whose parental income in 1997 places them in the lowest income quartile.

We first focus on the simulations for the population. In the first year of the policy that increases access to episode-specific contraception, we see a drop in the teen pregnancy rate. This happens despite the substitution of some individuals from no sex to sex that occurs because of the moral hazard generated by the lower costs of episode-specific contraception. The overall rate of sex has increased but the drop in unprotected sex leads to lower pregnancy rates. However, this drop in teen pregnancy rates is only short-term. By year three of the policy teen pregnancy rates actually rise as more individuals at sixteen are having sex now due to the increased rate of sexual activity in the long run. These patterns are reversed when contraception is made less accessible. Namely, there is virtually no effect of the policy in year one on teen pregnancy rates. However, both abstinence and incidence of unprotected sex increase in the short run. The rates of abstinence increase due to the higher contraception costs, which is the converse of the moral hazard described earlier. As time passes, the rates of abstinence increase, while those of unprotected sex decrease, due to habit persistence in teen sex behavior. On the whole, individuals at age sixteen are less sexually active having been exposed to the policy for three years, so much so that lower pregnancy rates result.

One might suspect that optimal policies will depend upon the characteristics of the individuals at the school. There may be schools where the sex rate is so high that encouraging contraception lowers pregnancy rates both in the short and the long run because the induced entry into sex is small. The second panel performs the same simulation except now on those individuals who were below the 25th percentile of the income distribution.[16] Here we see that the long run costs of increasing access to contraception are smaller than when looking at the population. However, the same patterns emerge: increasing access to episode-specific

[16]The income distribution refers to the observed parental income distribution in the data from the first wave of the survey.

Table 11: Short and Long Run Sex Behavior and Outcomes for 16 year olds[†]

			No Sex	Unprotected Sex	Episode-Specific Contraception	Scheduled Contraception	Pregnancy
Population	Increased Access to Episode-Specific	Year 1	-2.10%	-5.71%	17.35%	-8.62%	-0.46%
		Year 2	-3.18%	-4.74%	21.13%	-8.97%	1.04%
		Year 3	-3.73%	-4.09%	22.45%	-8.28%	1.86%
	Decreased Access to Contraception	Year 1	2.66%	7.99%	-13.64%	-16.72%	-0.12%
		Year 2	3.92%	6.69%	-16.36%	-19.83%	-1.98%
		Year 3	4.48%	5.65%	-17.35%	-20.86%	-3.00%
Low Income	Increased Access to Episode-Specific	Year 1	-2.22%	-6.23%	17.07%	-8.20%	-1.04%
		Year 2	-3.40%	-5.66%	20.41%	-8.93%	0.03%
		Year 3	-3.97%	-5.14%	21.42%	-8.35%	0.67%
	Decreased Access to Contraception	Year 1	2.92%	8.72%	-12.78%	-15.52%	1.02%
		Year 2	4.27%	7.89%	-15.09%	-18.16%	-0.36%
		Year 3	4.89%	7.11%	-15.88%	-19.03%	-1.15%

[†]Forecasted from the sample of 14 year-olds assuming the change in policy was a surprise. Percent changes use the forecasts with no policy as the base. For increased access to episode-specific contraception, we increase the intercept parameter in equation (6) by 0.2, leaving the fixed and transition costs unchanged. For decreased access to contraception, we lower the intercept parameters in equations (6) and (7) by 0.2. We experimented with different values for these changes and the qualitative results remained the same. Low income forecasts are done only for those individuals who had parents earnings at or below the 25th percentile of the income distribution in the data.

contraception, while attractive in the short run, increases pregnancies in the long run, with just the opposite occurring when access to contraception is decreased.

7 Conclusion

There is much persistence in teen sexual behavior. If this habit persistence arises from a moral or psychological barrier that has been crossed once once has sex for the first time (a fixed cost) or the first time in a relationship (a transition cost), programs that increase rates of teen sexual activity may lead to higher pregnancy rates in the long run than in the short run.

Our estimates show large transition and fixed costs to having sex. Persistence is also observed in using birth control methods like the pill, with smaller effects for condoms. The persistence in sexual activity is such that policies that affect access to contraception will have very different effects in the short run than the long run. Our results suggest that increasing access to contraception may actually increase long run pregnancy rates even though short run pregnancy rates fall. On the other hand, policies that decrease access to contraception, and hence sexual activity, are likely to lower pregnancy rates in the long run.

It needs to be emphasized that our focus is on teen sexual behavior and pregnancy outcomes. Hence our conclusions are not necessarily applicable to older individuals. For example, Goldin and Katz (2002) provide evidence on the benefits of the availability to oral contraception to women of college going and older ages. In our analysis we also do not examine the effects of access to contraception on incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. This is another factor that could be important in determining appropriate policies regarding access to contraception, particularly condoms.

There are many other factors, however, that may also point towards increased access to contraception having negative consequences. For example, Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) argue that contraception and birth control changed the bargaining terms between men and women, and led to an increase in out-of-wedlock births. We also do not examine the effects of peer networks or multiplicity of sexual partners on teen sexual decisions and pregnancy outcomes, both of which may lead to greater access to contraception having negative effects in the long run. For example, we may see fixed costs in the form of a moral or psychological

barrier the first time one has sex out of a committed relationship. To the degree that increased access to contraception encourages experimentation outside the committed relationship, habit persistence may again lead to greater access to contraception increasing teen pregnancy rates.

Future research that extends our analysis to incorporate factors such as sexually transmitted diseases, bargaining in relationships, and multiplicity of partners will improve our understanding of the consequences of increased access to contraception for teens. However, in spite of these limitations, we believe that our work is important in showing that, in the fragile realm of teen sex, even well intended contraception policies can be self-defeating.

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Appendix

In this appendix we show the estimating equations and results for the transition parameters on whether or not one's mother works full-time, whether a divorce occurs, and whether the individual lives with his biological mother. This last measure is designed to capture whether the individual no longer lives at home without modeling every possible living arrangement. We assume that the state variables at time t depend only on the state variables at time $t-1$:

$$P(s_t|s_{t-1}) = P(s_t|s_{t-1}, s_{t-2}, ...)$$

We assume that each follows a logit process subject to the following restrictions:

1. Divorce is an absorbing state

2. No longer living with one's biological mother is an absorbing state

Since we cannot distinguish between full-time and part-time work for the mother in the first wave, we estimate the transitions using outcomes from waves 3-5 with the corresponding lagged values coming from waves 2-4.

Table 12 presents the estimates of the transition parameters. The most significant predictor of one's mother working full-time at time t is whether one's mother worked full-time at time $t-1$. Living with both biological parents reduces the probability of the mother working, though this effect is less than one-tenth the size of the lagged mother working effect. The effect of a praying mother is also negative, but smaller and only marginally significant. The coefficients on age and black are small and insignificant.

The probability of the biological family remaining intact at time t falls if the mother worked at time $t-1$. A mother who prayed regularly in 1997 increases the probability of the family remaining intact, while black families are significantly more likely to experience divorce. An intact family at time $t-1$ significantly lowers the probability an individual will leave home, as does begin black and having higher test scores. Not surprisingly, age has a strong positive effect on the probability of leaving home.

Table 12: Transition Parameters

	Mother Work		Intact Family		Leave Home	
	Coeff	Std Err	Coeff	Std Err	Coeff	Std Err
Lag Mother Work	3.351	0.083	-0.937	0.288	-0.164	0.118
Lag Intact Family	-0.263	0.087			-0.808	0.121
Black	-0.053	0.101	-0.816	0.294	-0.418	0.141
Age	-0.017	0.033	0.128	0.099	0.517	0.046
Mother Prays	-0.158	0.085	0.541	0.253		
Math Score (00's)					-0.465	0.177
Constant	-0.729	0.565	1.946	1.669	-10.78	0.839
Observations	4737		2642		5088	